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Abstract 
'Maqasid al-Shariah' are masalih that provide answers to the questions about the hierarchy of interests in Islamic 
law. Maqasid include the wisdoms behind rulings, such as 'enhancing social welfare,' which is one of the 
wisdoms behind charity, and 'developing consciousness of God,' which is one of the wisdoms behind fasting. 
Maqasid are also good ends that the laws aim to achieve by blocking, or opening, certain means. Thus, the 
Maqasid of 'preserving people's minds and souls' explain the total and strict Islamic ban on alcohol and 
intoxicants. Maqasid are also the group of divine intents and moral concepts upon which the Islamic law is 
based, such as, justice, human dignity, free will, magnanimity, facilitation, and social cooperation. Thus, they 
represent the link between the Islamic law and today's notions of human rights, development, and civility. The 
term 'maqsid' (plural: Maqasid) refers to a purpose, objective, principle, intent, goal, end [16: a, ii], telos 
(Greek), finalité (French), or Zweck (German) [21]. Maqasid of the Islamic law are the objectives/purposes 
behind Islamic rulings. [17: 183] For a number of Islamic legal theorists, it is an alternative expression to 
'people's interests' (masalih ). 
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1. Introduction  
Modern scholarship introduced new conceptions and classifications of al-Maqasid by giving consideration to 
new dimensions. First, considering the scope of rulings they cover, contemporary classifications divide Maqasid 
into three levels [22: 26-35]: 
1- General Maqasid: These Maqasid are observed throughout the entire body of the Islamic law, such as 
the necessities and needs mentioned above and newly proposed Maqasid, such as 'justice' and 
'facilitation.'  
2- Specific Maqasid: These Maqasid are observed throughout a certain 'chapter' of the Islamic law, such as 
the welfare of children in family law, preventing criminals in criminal law, and preventing monopoly 
in financial transactions law. 
3- Partial Maqasid: These Maqasid are the 'intents' behind specific scripts or rulings, such as the intent of 
discovering the truth in seeking a certain number of witnesses in certain court cases, the intent of 
alleviating difficulty in allowing an ill and fasting person to break his/her fasting, and the intent of 
feeding the poor in banning Muslims from storing meat during Eid days. 
In order to remedy the individuality drawback, the notion of Maqasid has been expanded to include a wider 
scope of people - the community, nation, or humanity, in general. Ibn Ashur, for example, gave Maqasid that 
are concerned with the 'nation' (ummah) priority over Maqasid that are concerned with individuals. Rashid Rida, 
for a second example, included 'reform' and 'women's rights' in his theory of Maqasid. Yusuf al-Qaradawi, for a 
third example, included 'human dignity and rights' in his theory of Maqasid. 
The following are examples of these new universal Maqasid: 
1- Rashid Rida (d.1354AH/1935 CE) surveyed the Quran to identify its Maqasid, which included, 'reform 
of the pillars of faith, and spreading awareness that Islam is the religion of pure natural disposition, 
reason, knowledge, wisdom, proof, freedom, independence, social, political, and economic reform, and 
women rights' [25: v. 7: 100].  
2- Al-Tahir Ibn Ashur (d.1325 AH/1907 CE) proposed that the universal maqsid of the Islamic law is to 
maintain 'orderliness, equality, freedom, facilitation, and the preservation of pure natural disposition 
(fitrah)' [17:183]. It is to be noted that the purpose of 'freedom' (hurriyah), which was proposed by Ibn 
Ashur and several other contemporary scholars, is different from the purpose of 'freedom' (`itq), which 
was mentioned by jurists [10: v. 4: 513). Al-`itq is freedom from  slavery, not 'freedom' in the 
contemporary sense. 'Will' (Mashi'ah ), however, is a well-known Islamic term that bears a number of 
similarities with current conceptions of 'freedom' and 'free will.' For example, 'freedom of belief' is 
expressed in the Quran as the 'will to believe or disbelieve' (for example, Al-Kahf 18:29). 
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In terms of terminology, 'freedom' (al-hurriyah) is a 'newly-coined' purpose in the literature of the Islamic law. 
Ibn Ashur, interestingly, accredited his usage of the term hurriyah to 'literature of the French revolution, which 
were translated from French to Arabic in the nineteenth century CE' [16: 268], even though he elaborated on an 
Islamic perspective on freedom of thought, belief, expression, and action in the mashi'ah sense [16: 270-281]. 
1- Mohammad al-Ghazali (d.1416 AH/ 1996 CE) called for 'learning lessons from the previous fourteen 
centuries of Islamic history,' and therefore, included 'justice and freedom' in Maqasid at the necessities 
level [11: 49].  
2- Yusuf al-Qaradawi (1345 AH/1926 CE - ) also surveyed the Quran and concluded the following 
universal Maqasid: Preserving true faith, maintaining human dignity and rights, calling people to 
worship God, purifying the soul, restoring moral values, building good families, treating women fairly, 
building a strong Islamic nation, and calling for a cooperative world [8]. However, al-Qaradawi 
explains that proposing a theory in universal Maqasid should only happen after developing a level of 
experience with detailed scripts (Oral Discussions, London, UK, March, 2005, and Sarajevo, Bosnia, 
May, 2007). 
3- Taha al-Alwani (1354 AH/ 1935 CE - ) also surveyed the Quran to identify its 'supreme and prevailing' 
Maqasid, which are, according to him, 'the oneness of God (tawhid), purification of the soul (tazkiyah), 
and developing civilisation on earth (imran )' [3: 25]. He is currently writing a separate monograph to 
elaborate on each of these three Maqasid (Oral Discussion, Cairo, Egypt, April, 2007). 
All of the Maqasid in the diagram were presented as they appeared in the minds and perceptions of the above 
jurists. None of the following classic or contemporary classifications and structures could claim to be 'according 
to the original divine will.  
If we refer to nature that God created, we will never find natural structures that could be represented in terms of 
circles, pyramids, or boxes, as the above diagram shows. All such structures in science and humanities too, and 
the categories they include, are human-made for the sake of illustration for themselves and other humans. 
Therefore, al-Maqasid structure is best described as a 'multi-dimensional' structure, in which levels of necessity, 
scope of rulings, scope of people, and levels of universality are all valid dimensions that represent valid 
viewpoints and classifications. 
The above twentieth-century views also show that Maqasid al-Shariah are, actually, representations of each 
scholar's own viewpoint for reform and development of the Islamic law, despite the fact that all these Maqasid 
were 'induced' from the scripts. 
This fusion of the scripts and contemporary needs for reform gives al-Maqasid special significance. We view 
Maqasid as one of today's most important intellectual means and methodologies for Islamic reform. It is a 
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methodology from 'within' the Islamic scholarship that addresses the Islamic mind and Islamic concerns. This 
approach is radically different from projects for Islamic 'reform' and 'renewal' that come from 'without' the 
Islamic terminology and scholarship. 
We shall now present a brief historical account of the ideas of Maqasid, from the Companions of the Prophet's 
(peace be upon him) era to our current time. 
2. Al-Maqasid in the Companions' Era 
The history of the idea of speculating a certain underlying purpose, aim, or intent of Quranic or Prophetic 
instructions goes back to the Companions of the Prophet, as narrated in a number of incidents. 
One clear and popular example is the multi-chained hadith of 'afternoon prayers at Bani Quraizah, one of the 
Jewish tribes resided in Madinah,' in which the Prophet sent a group of Companions to Bani Quraizah, and 
ordered them to pray their afternoon (asr) prayer there (Al-Bukhari). The span of time allowed for asr prayers 
had almost expired before the group reached Bani Quraizah. Thus, they found themselves divided into 
supporters of two different opinions, one opinion entailed praying at Bani Quraizah's anyway and the other 
opinion entailed praying on the way (before the prayer time was over). 
The rationale behind the first opinion was that the Prophet's instruction was clear in asking everybody to pray at 
Bani Quraizah, while the rationale of the second opinion was that the Prophet's 'purpose/intent' of the order was 
to ask the group to hasten to Bani Quraizah, rather than 'meaning/intending to' postpone prayers until after its 
due time. 
According to the narrator, when the Companions later narrated the story to the Prophet, he approved both 
opinions. The approval of the Prophet, as jurists and Imams said, entails the permissibility and correctness of 
both views. The only prime jurist who disagreed with the Companions who prayed on the way was Ibn Hazm 
al-Zahiri (the literalist), who wrote that they should have prayed the 'afternoon prayer' after they reach Bani 
Quraizah, as the Prophet had said, even after midnight [19: 291]. 
Another incident, which shows a more serious consequence of taking a 'purpose-oriented' approach to the 
Prophetic instructions occurred during the days of Umar, the second caliph. The status of Umar in Islam and his 
continuous and wide-ranging consultation of a large number of Companions, make his opinions of special 
significance. 
In this incident, the Companions asked Umar to distribute the newly-'conquered' lands of Egypt and Iraq 
amongst them as some sort of 'spoils of war.' Their argument relied on the clear and specific verses of the Quran 
that allowed fighters their 'spoils of war' [2: 14, 81; 14: 110]. 
Umar refused to divide whole cities and provinces over the Companions by referring to other verses, with more 
general expressions, stating that God has a 'purpose' of 'not making the rich dominate wealth. Therefore, Umar 
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(and the Companions who supported his opinion) understood the specifics of the verses of 'spoils of war' within 
the context of a certain purpose (maqsid ) of the law. This purpose was, 'diminishing the difference between 
economic levels,' to use familiar contemporary terms. 
The significance of Umar's ijtihad (personal reasoning) is that it could, traditionally, be considered as a 
'collective ijtihad' carried out by (a large number of) the Companions. This ijtihad has its significance in fiqh 
(Islamic Jurisprudence), regardless of the 'authority' of a Companion's opinion, which is a matter of difference 
of opinion within traditional schools of the law . 
Another telling example is Umar's application of a moratorium on the (Islamic) punishment for theft during the 
famine of Medina [12: 190]. He thought that applying the punishment prescribed in the scripts, while people are 
in need of basic supplies for their survival, goes against the general principle of justice, which he considered 
more fundamental. 
A third example from Umar's fiqh (application of the law) is when he did not apply the 'apparent meaning' of the 
hadith that clearly gives a soldier the right to the spoils of war from opponents [20: 291]. He decided to give 
soldiers only one-fifth of these spoils, if they were 'significantly valuable,' with a purpose to achieve fairness 
amongst soldiers and enrich the public trust. 
A fourth example is Umar's decision to include horses in the types of wealth included in the obligatory charity 
of zakah, despite the Prophet's clear instruction to exclude them. Umar's rationale was that horses at his time 
were becoming significantly more valuable than camels, which the Prophet included in zakah at his time [10: v. 
2:192; 13: v. 4: 216]. In other words, Umar understood the 'purpose' of the zakah in terms of a form of social 
assistance that is paid by the wealthy for the sake of the poor, regardless of the exact types of wealth that were 
mentioned in the Prophetic tradition and understood via its literal implication [8 : 229]. 
All known schools of law, except for the Hanafis, are against such expansion of 'the pool of charity' (wi`a' al-
zakah), which illustrates how literalism had a strong influence on traditional juridical methods. There is no 
zakah on horses, commercial goods, or any other type of wealth' [19: 209]. It is clear how such opinion hinders 
the institution of zakah from achieving any meaningful sense of justice or social welfare. 
However, Umar did not take this purpose-oriented approach to all rulings of the Islamic law. Al-Bukhari 
narrates that Umar was asked: 'Why do we still jog around the Kabah with our shoulders uncovered even after 
Islam had prevailed in Makkah?' The story behind the question is that after the 'conquest of Makkah,' the people 
of Makkah claimed the Prophet and his Companions lost their health during their prolonged stay in Madinah. 
The Prophet, therefore, ordered the Companions to jog around the Kabah with their shoulders uncovered in a 
show of strength. Umar, however, did not take a purpose-oriented approach to this question. He answered: 'We 
do not cease doing anything we used to do at the Prophet's time' [5]. 
Umar, thus, made a distinction between 'acts of worship' (ibadat) and 'worldly transactions' (muamalat), a 
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distinction that was later endorsed by all schools of usul al-fiqh. Al-Shatibi, for example, expressed this 
distinction when he wrote: 'Literal compliance is the default methodology in the area of acts of worship 
(ibadat), while the consideration of purposes is the default methodology in the area of worldly dealings 
(muamalat )' [9: v. 2: 6]. 
The above examples are meant to illustrate early conceptions of Maqasid in the application of the Islamic law 
and the implications of giving them fundamental importance. 
3. Maqasid-al-shariah and protection of women’s rights 
Prejudices against women are a universal phenomenon, found in almost every human society. When such 
prejudices are sought to be given religious sanction, it becomes much more difficult to do away with them. 
Lamentably, certain views and prescriptions contained in the corpus of traditional Muslim jurisprudence or fiqh 
do indeed militate against women, and even go against the spirit and teachings of Islam, a religion that stresses 
women’s rights and equal status. 
Things, however, are beginning to change today. Some Muslim scholars, based in certain Arab countries and in 
the West, are developing a contextually-relevant fiqh for women, or what is called fiqh al-nisa. One of the 
leading scholars in this regard is the well-known Allamah Yusuf al-Qaradawi, an Egyptian alim who is now 
based in Qatar. He has issued numerous fatwas related to women’s issues that depart, in significant ways, from 
traditional fiqh prescriptions. For instance, he argues that it is not prohibited for a man to shake a woman’s hand 
as a customary greeting, for a woman to take up employment outside the home and even to become the head of 
state of a country. He engages in contextual ijtihad or personal reasoning based on the principal sources of the 
Islamic tradition—the Quran and Hadith—to come up with such novel views. 
 It is reported that, in the context of the death of the Emperor of Persia, who was succeeded by his daughter, the 
Prophet mentioned that a people who were ruled by a woman would not succeed. This hadith report has been 
taken by most ulema to imply that a woman should never become the head of state of a country. 
Allamah al-Qaradawi engages in a contextual analysis of this report to come out with a fiqh prescription that is 
precisely the opposite of what most traditionalist ulema uphold. He argues that this report has to be understood 
in the backdrop of the context that the Prophet was addressing. That was a time when many countries, such as 
Persia, were ruled by male monarchs, some of whom claimed to be divinely-appointed. They enjoyed dictatorial 
powers, and could do just as they pleased. There was no concept of democracy then. That was the context in 
which the Prophet had made his remark. Today, Allamah al-Qaradawi argues, the political context is totally 
different. Most countries today are, at least in theory, no longer ruled by dictatorial monarchs, and pay at least 
lip-service to democracy. Today, a single person cannot decide the fate of an entire country. Rather, governance 
has now become a vastly complicated affair. There is a whole system or apparatus for this, a set of formal rules, 
a massive bureaucracy, parliaments, courts and so on. Hence, Allamah al-Qaradawi argues, in today’s context it 
is indeed permissible for women to become the head of state. He backs this conclusion by pointing to the 
reference in the Muslim tradition to Bilquis, Queen of Sheba, who was permitted to rule by the Prophet 
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Sulaiman or Solomon. Since Muslims believe that Solomon was a divinely-appointed Prophet and that all 
prophets must be respected and their example followed, obviously the practice of Solomon in allowing Bilquis 
to rule cannot be considered to be un-Islamic. 
If you see the countries that have had women heads of state, such as India, Bangladesh, Ireland, Pakistan and Sri 
Lanka, you will have to admit that these women did not rule any worse than their male counterparts before or 
after them. These countries did not decline just because they had female rulers. 
Sadly, we have few ulema of the caliber of Allamah al-Qaradawi in South Asia who are seeking to evolve 
contextually-relevant understandings of women with regard to fiqh-related issues. Take, for instance, the All-
India Muslim Personal Law Board, which sees itself as the apex body of the Indian ulema with regard to 
Muslim personal law issues, including, and especially, those related to women and family matters. The vast 
majority of the members of the Board are very traditionalist-minded. I personally feel that the Board must 
include more ulema, as well as Muslim social activists, who are better aware of the contemporary social context 
and demands, including the many problems faced by Muslim women, and who are able to engage in ijtihad with 
regard to a number of problematic issues. Sadly, there are very few such ulema in the Board, and their views are 
silenced by the conservatives, who are averse to ijtihad and insist on taqid or blindly following the prescriptions 
of the medieval ulema of the different maslaks or schools of Muslim jurisprudence. 
Take the case, for instance, the issue of three talaqs in one sitting, which the Board has yet to resolve. This 
practice has led to literally thousands of Muslim women being arbitrarily divorced by their husbands. Most 
traditional jurists are of the view that three talaqs in one sitting constitute an irrevocable and final divorce. But, 
there are others today, as well as in the past, such as Ibn Taimiyah, Ibn al-Qaiyyim, Allamah Showkani and so 
on, and the ulema of the Ahl-e Hadith and Shia Jafari schools, who take this as one, revocable talaq. There are 
also statements of the Prophet to back their argument. The traditionalists refuse to listen to their claims, 
however, because they are wedded to the doctrine of taqlid.  
One way to win them over is to consider the issue in the backdrop of the spirit or aims of the shariah, whose 
basic thrust is establishing justice. When the matter is understood in this way, and if the ulema can be convinced 
that the practice of triple talaq in one sitting is resulting in a gross violation of justice, the fundamental principle 
of the shariah, by causing such great suffering to divorced women and their children, it might make them change 
their views or cause them to allow for talfiq, or resorting to the opinions of other schools of Muslim 
jurisprudence, in such matters. There is a desperate need for our Indian ulema, including those associated with 
the Board, to expand their thinking about these issues, and to give particular attention to social realities, needs 
and problems, rather than advocating rigid taqlid. 
In such matters, taqlid can amount to ignoring the aims of the shariah (maqasid al-shariah). Sadly, the issue of 
maqasid al-shariah is not given much attention to in the madrasas where our ulema are trained. This is a 
reflection of the fact that our madrasas, and traditional Islamic thought more generally, have remained stuck in a 
narrow framework defined by medieval fiqh. Today, however, some Muslim scholars, in Egypt and America, 
for instance, are trying to revive the tradition of articulating fiqh prescriptions in the light of maqasid al-shariah, 
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and this is also reflected in some of their fatwas on women-related issues. Some of them resort to, and freely 
take from, other schools of Muslim jurisprudence, not being bound by the opinions of just one school that they 
might find too strict or inappropriate as regards issues related to women, for instance. Others advocate what is 
called fiqh us-sunnah, that is approaching the Quran and the genuine Hadith directly, instead of being bound by 
the prescriptions of the established schools of fiqh. In other words, and this is an approach we agree that, they 
take what they find useful in the established fiqh but abandon what they might feel is against the Quran and 
Prophetic Sunnah. In this way, they have been able to open up new spaces and opportunities for Muslim women 
and to uphold their rights, as given in the Quran, which may have been overshadowed, neglected or suppressed 
in the traditional corpus of fiqh. 
This approach is in accord with the established principle in usul al-fiqh, the principles of Muslim jurisprudence, 
that changing conditions and times might necessitate changes in some ahkamat or juridical rules. This principle 
validates new solutions to new social contexts and social problems, and is related to the wider issue of ijtihad. 
The noted eighteenth century South Asian Muslim scholar, Shah Waliullah Dehlawi, advocated the same sort of 
approach. He critiqued taqlid and argued that only those prescriptions of the corpus of medieval fiqh should be 
accepted that were in accordance with the Quran and the genuine Hadith. He was also open to the idea of ulema 
of one maslak borrowing from other maslaks where the need so arose. Ironically, although all the major Sunni 
traditions in South Asia, including the Deobandis, Barelvis and Ahl-e Hadith, claim to follow in the tradition of 
Shah Waliullah, they have not shown the same broadmindedness as he in the matter of ijtihad and fiqh. The 
Deobandis and Barelvis still insist on rigid taqlid of Hanafi jurisprudence, some aspects of which clearly militate 
against women’s rights, even those that are granted to them by the Quran. 
4.  Conclusion 
 In this context, as a Muslim female I appeal to our ulema to learn from the example of Shah Waliullah, whom 
they hold in high esteem, and to adopt a less rigid and more expansive approach to the question of taqlid versus 
ijtihad, including on some very problematic issues concerning women. 
The expansion of the scope of Maqasid allows them to respond to global issues and concerns, and to evolve 
from 'wisdoms behind the rulings' to practical plans for reform and renewal. 
Finally, contemporary scholarship has introduced new universal Maqasid that were directly induced from the 
scripts, rather than from the body of fiqh literature in the schools of Islamic law. This approach, significantly, 
allowed Maqasid to overcome the historicity of fiqh edicts and represent the scripts' higher values and 
principles. Detailed rulings would, then, stem from these universal principles. 
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